The Byzantine emperor established no permanent
missions in foreign countries though he usually sent the same highly trusted
nobles and clerics on his embassies. As a matter of practice, these
ambassadors were familiar with the countries they visited, either through
previous travels or thorough their ethnic backgrounds. Even so, they were
thoroughly briefed before they set out. Not only were they drilled on the
details of the goals to be achieved, but they were also apprised of current
developments in the court they were visiting. Constant contact was
maintained with Constantinople, and diplomatic missions could sometimes last
up to a year. The Byzantines probably initiated the practice of sending
regular diplomatic reports home to the government.
What separated Byzantium from other nations of the early
Middle Ages was its active involvement in manipulating internal events in
other countries. Today we take for granted the existence of government
agencies which gather and interpret intelligence, cultivate support in
foreign circles and perhaps even instigate rebellion. To find such a
sophisticated and centralized arrangement as early as the sixth century is
truly remarkable.
To aid in dealing with other nations, the Byzantines
established an organization called the 'Bureau of Barbarians', which
gathered information from every source imaginable (even priests) and kept
files on who was influential, who was susceptible to bribery, what a
nation's historical roots were, what was likely to impress them, etc. In
many cases, the information gathered by the Bureau was the first written
record of these peoples, since barbarian tribes rarely had writing of their
own. Armed with this knowledge, Byzantine emperors and diplomats had a
complete understanding of the strengths of their allies and the weaknesses
of their enemies.
The Byzantines employed a number of tactics, both overt
and covert, to achieve their aims through diplomatic means rather than
through force of arms: the use of ceremony was one such tactic. Imagine
yourself as the chief of a nomadic tribe whose home is the steppes of
central Asia. You are visited by representatives of the Byzantine emperor
who shower you with fabulous gifts and invite you to the imperial palace in
Constantinople. Your entourage arrives in a city inhabited by almost half a
million people - perhaps three times the size of your entire tribe. Its
buildings are protected by huge walls, deep moats and well-armed soldiers.
You see goods from all over the world in the bazaars. You view centuries-old
cathedrals and are mystified by the Christian ritual.
You are led to a huge, ornate palace. On either side of
you in the audience hall there are golden mechanical lions that open their
mouths and roar. In golden trees are mechanical birds who sing. In front of
you, seated upon a golden throne, is the emperor, attended by a chief
minister. You approach the throne and prostrate yourself in front of it. You
are bidden to rise and when you look up you discover that the emperor,
throne and all, is suspended high above your head. Later, imperial officials
give you rich presents and inform you that more wealth and support will be
forthcoming if you will fight the emperor's enemies (pocketing any booty you
may pick up along the way). It was a rare tribal chief who would turn down
such an offer. This process was repeated time and time again throughout the
history of Byzantium and it encouraged many to ally with the empire.
Another tactic was bribery. The bezant was the dollar of
the Middle Ages and it purchased a lot of influence. Money was spread around
freely, but bribery was actually very cost-effective. Often a well-placed
bag of gold saved Byzantium from raising, supplying and deploying an army.
No one was considered above targeting for bribery. In the late eleventh
century, a Seljuk Sultan sent an ambassador to Constantinople to settle a
border dispute. The Emperor Alexius I Comnenus struck a secret deal with the
ambassador, 'buying' the fortress of Sinope from him. By the time the Sultan
discovered what had happened; Byzantine troops had already occupied the
city.
Some 200 years later, the empire's greatest enemy was
Charles of Anjou, who controlled the island of Sicily and much of the
Italian mainland. Charles had ambitions to take Constantinople and establish
himself as emperor. Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaeologus prevented an
Angevin attack in 1270 by sending a shipment of gold to Pope Nicholas III.
In exchange, the pope forbade Charles to attack Constantinople and diverted
his efforts to a crusade in Tunisia.
A further diplomatic ploy was the use of surrogates. The
Byzantines hated the expense of war and could hardly afford the cost in
human life. Often they would get others to fight for them. If the Bulgars
were troublesome, the Russians were called in. If the Russians were
troublesome the Patzinaks (a central Asian tribe) were summoned. The Cumans
and Uzes acted as checks on the Patzinaks and so on. The Byzantines almost
always had an ally to the geographic rear of a potential enemy.
The Byzantine emperor maintained a 'stable' of pretenders
to almost every foreign throne in the known world. For instance, if the
Turkish sultan seemed poised to attack, the Byzantine emperor could release
a pretender, perhaps a younger brother of the Sultan. With Byzantine gold in
his pockets and some armed supporters, the pretender could be counted on to
wreak havoc in Turkish territory, spoiling the Sultan's attack.
In 1282, faced once again by the threat posed by Charles
of Anjou, Michael VIII helped instigate the War of the Sicilian Vespers, in
which native Sicilians rose up against Angevin rule. The rebellion ended
Charles' dream of ruling in Constantinople. Michael VIII himself wrote:
'should I dare to claim that I was God's instrument to bring freedom to the
Sicilians, then I should only be stating the truth'.
The word 'byzantine' has come to mean 'devious or
characterized by intrigue'. This is due to some of the plots of questionable
morality (but indisputable utility) that Byzantine emperors concocted. The
Byzantines were of the opinion that anything done in the name of the Sacred
Empire could not be judged treachery. Though they were diligent in adhering
to the letter of their international agreements, they often violated the
spirit of them. Strategic advantage was sought with fervor in every
situation.
The Emperor Heraclius once intercepted a message from the
Persian King Chosroes which ordered the execution of one of his generals,
Shahr-Baraz. Heraclius added the names of 400 other Persian officers to the
list and diverted the message to Shahr-Baraz. Heraclius' stratagem was
deviously brilliant. Had the executions been carried out, the Persian
military would have been decapitated. Instead, Shahr-Baraz and the other
officers rose in rebellion against Chosroes and overthrew him, subsequently
making peace with Byzantium.
In another episode, a hostile Venetian fleet wintered at
the island of Chios, directly threatening Byzantine territory. The Venetians
sent ambassadors to Constantinople to negotiate an agreement. The Emperor
Manuel I Comnenus refused to see them. The ambassadors returned to Chios
with a Byzantine official, who suggested another embassy. The Venetian Doge
commanding the fleet agreed to do so. After the second embassy had departed,
illness swept through the Venetian camp. More than 1,000 soldiers and
sailors died within a few days. The second embassy returned without having
met with the emperor.
Sick from the plague (rumors spread that the Byzantines
had poisoned the water), the Venetians sent a third embassy to
Constantinople. By now well-informed of conditions in the Venetian camp,
Manuel realized he need make no concessions. He stretched out negotiations
for so long that the Doge was obliged to withdraw the fleet or face a mutiny
among his ailing sailors. As the fleet limped back to Venice, a Byzantine
naval force attacked without warning and decimated the Venetians. Soon
afterward, Manuel sent a message to the Doge which literally added insult to
injury: 'Your nation has for a long time behaved with great stupidity'.
It is important to resist the temptation to dismiss all
these tactics as self-serving, self-justifying and Machiavellian. Had the
Byzantines been less so, European history might have been greatly changed.
Byzantine diplomacy was crucial not only in preserving the Byzantine Empire,
but in preventing the Islamization of Europe. Without this outpost of
Christendom deflecting the Muslim tide from the seventh century to the
fifteenth, it is unlikely that Western civilization as we now know it would
have endured. By the time the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II took the city of
Constantinople by assault in 1453 and renamed it Istanbul, the states of
Eastern Europe had absorbed enough Byzantine culture (and diplomatic
technique) to stand on their own. The walls of Constantinople and the
imperial diplomats gave the fledgling Christian religion 700 years to grow
and prosper.
Many historians have vilified the Byzantines for their
tactics, often justifiably. Still, one does not have to approve of
Byzantium's tactics to learn from them. Even today, diplomats frequently
complain that the other side 'did not negotiate in good faith' or 'cheated'.
The European Community negotiators and the United Nations teams spent
countless hours thrashing out ceasefire agreements in Yugoslavia, only to
see the best-crafted of them broken the next day. Like it or not, just
because a nation cannot summon overwhelming military or economic strength
does not mean it lacks the machinery to work its will. Though diplomatic
practices today are much more civilized (or are they?), we should recognize
in advance a country's tendency to use diplomacy the way the Byzantines did
- as a low-cost, low-risk, maneuverable and effective weapon.