When the Missouri Supreme Court ruled teachers could bargain collectively, it set in motion a unique battle over how representation would be set. The state has an NEA affiliate, but it also has a larger, non-union teacher organization, the Missouri State Teachers Association. The two sides are butting heads in Springfield. Springfield NEA (SNEA) wants exclusive representation. MSTA wants multiple representatives.
The Springfield News-Leader described the arguments in circuit court:
Much of SNEA’s arguments hinged on its position that collective bargaining is a “term of art,” meaning that it’s historically and uniformly understood to mean exclusive representation through a majority rule vote.
Though not explicit in the state constitution, collective bargaining is implied as such because it is a term of art, Barker said.
To drive home the point, SNEA called in an expert witness on labor and law — Joseph Slater, a professor of law and values at the University of Toledo College of Law.
Slater provided for the court a historical backdrop of labor law in the United States, citing numerous cases and statutes that involved collective bargaining for private and public sector workers.
“Collective bargaining is a term of art that necessarily includes the idea of exclusive representation because that’s the way it has always been in America,” Slater said in his testimony. “Collective bargaining was never intended to benefit the employer by fragmenting the employees.”
NEA is correct in stating that exclusive representation and collective bargaining have in practice gone hand-in-hand, but that’s still a long way from claiming that exclusive representation is part of collective bargaining by definition. Once you allow that type of reasoning, there is no limit to rights and privileges one can claim under the law.
I’m reminded of the story of the Army Corps of Engineers’ migratory bird rule – which forever became known as the “glancing goose test.” The Corps extended federal regulatory controls over bodies of water fully contained within the borders of a single state by claiming jurisdiction over anyof those areas that “are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds which cross state lines.” Yes, if a bird flew across a state line and glanced down at a body of water, the feds could regulate it by authority of the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
It’s hopeless, I suppose, to wish to be ruled by what the law says, rather than what opposing advocates claim everyone knows it means.